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Abstract 
Many central banks adopt an active investment style for reserve management. This paper discusses various possible 
enhancements to active management tools and processes to generate extra returns in an increasingly challenging 
environment. The proposed framework is based on an affine model, which includes macroeconomic and market 
sentiment indicators among the explanatory variables. Using estimates of expected excess returns drawn from the 
model, an operational indicator produces input highlighting the portfolio’s exposure to duration risk. This indicator is 
incorporated within a broader framework, in which a scorecard considers a range of qualitative elements, including 
consensus figures on macroeconomic data, monetary policy and interest rates. These elements are then combined with 
the model output to produce a comprehensive indication with respect to portfolio deviation from the benchmark. It 
should be noted that the approach presented in this paper is experimental; it has not yet been used in an active portfolio. 
Finally, consideration is given to the governance of the central bank investment process in order to assess how the 
proposed enhancements could strengthen the decision-making process. The analysis suggests that the scorecard with 
model-based input may address some weaknesses inherent in tactical decision- making. 
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1. Introduction 
The current financial environment, characterised by very low yields and changes in market microstructure, has 
highlighted an imperative for active investors to optimise their assessment of market timing, and more generally their 
capacity to identify potential sources of additional return.  
 
Many central banks adopt a moderately active investment style in managing their foreign reserves as they strive to 
achieve extra returns on benchmark allocation within parameters consistent with the traditional paradigm of safety, 
liquidity and return. Against this background, this paper discusses various possible enhancements to central banks’ 
active management tools and processes. 
 
First, we develop a linear affine model in line with a framework set out by Adrian et al (2013), testing a range of 
specifications in terms of explanatory variables, including macroeconomic, financial stress and sentiment indicators. 
The estimation is based on monthly data. The model shows statistically significant predictive power for a set of one- 
month expected excess returns of US bonds along a wide maturity spectrum. The content of information embodied in 
the estimated time-varying risk premia also includes a tangible value for a portfolio manager, in that the set of 
predictive variables (risk factors) can significantly expand the opportunity set of feasible risk-adjusted returns from 
trading US bonds. We go on to demonstrate how such estimates can be used to provide an operational signal – a 
multifactor quantitative indicator – to position portfolio exposures to certain risk factors, such as duration risk.  
 
In the second step, this multifactor quantitative indicator is applied in conjunction with a scorecard approach. The 
signal drawn from a strictly empirical analysis of macroeconomic and sentiment indicators is combined with various 
qualitative indicators: market consensus figures on macroeconomic data, monetary policy, as well as expectations on 
interest rate developments. The scorecard supports active positioning by reducing subjectivity and supporting 
synthesis, and delivers a clear operational indication in terms of deviation from the benchmark. 
 
Finally, we attempt to apply these enhancements to a governance framework usually associated with a central 
bank’s active investment process, with the expectation that some adjustments may be necessary to accommodate 
certain enhancements. Consideration is accordingly given to a number of stylised governance paradigms, taking into 
account the different hierarchical levels and organisational structures typically involved in the active management 
process, the tools supporting decision-making and the time horizons. Our analysis shows that many central banks 
adopt a three-layer decision-making framework that includes an intermediate (tactical) level, which, due to its hybrid 
nature, may have specific weaknesses. Several features of the scorecard approach – which includes multifactor 
quantitative input – may effectively address some of these issues. 
 
This paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, recent developments relevant to the context in which official 
reserve management activity are reviewed. Section 3 outlines the linear affine model and its results. Section 4 
describes the scorecard approach. Section 5 moves from the broader theme of central bank investment governance, 
offering specific suggestions to improve decision-making at the tactical level. 
 
2. A challenging environment for reserve managers 
The current financial environment poses serious challenges to central banks acting in their capacity as investors of 
official reserves. 
 
One particular issue confronting central banks’ strategic and active investment decisions in recent years is the 
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exceptionally low level of interest rates. Despite a widespread trend towards greater diversification, central bank 
investment portfolios typically retain a focus on safe assets whose yields, after 2007, have dropped to unprecedented 
levels due to a combination of massive supply and demand imbalances1 and extremely accommodative monetary 
policies by major central banks.  
 
These low yields reduce the potential returns of central bank asset allocations and may threaten the primary goal 
of capital preservation; indeed, the current environment introduces scope for significant mark-to-market losses, as 
rates eventually embark upon a structural, upward cycle. Available evidence2 suggests that reserve managers now 
consider a return of rates to normal levels as the most relevant risk for the near future; some are already shifting their 
investment strategies towards defensive interest rate exposures that mitigate the risk of mark-to-market losses but 
magnify a negative carry between foreign reserve holdings and sterilisation costs. Central banks may address this 
issue by replacing safe havens with asset classes that, while improving the overall portfolio risk/return profile based 
on historical correlation patterns, may reduce liquidity and store-of-value features below normal central bank 
standards.  
 
The current low-yield environment also represents a real challenge to how traditional central bank active portfolio 
management3 has hitherto been conducted. Strategies aimed at generating some extra return on top of the strategic 
asset allocation by exploiting moderate risk budgets are quite common among official reserve managers. A survey of 
a group of central banks in the European Union, carried out for the purpose of this study, shows that 20 out of 21 
participating central banks adopt a moderately active style in managing their foreign reserves4 (for further details see 
Section 3); previous evidence which includes non-European central banks is in line with these findings.5 Low yields 
reduce the scope for carry-based strategies, as well as potential income from securities lending. Furthermore, 
extremely low risk premia and tight spreads potentially limit opportunities for generating excess return by exploiting 
the credit leeway available to active portfolio managers, as eligible securities other than government bonds provide 
little yield enhancement and limited protection against adverse spread developments. 
 
Recent regulatory changes and technological innovation over the last few years have affected bond yield dynamics, 
altering the microstructure of financial markets in which reserve managers operate. 
 
Regulations aimed at limiting banks’ proprietary trading activity and introducing strict criteria for permissible 
market-making are already in place in the United States6. Some argue that these changes pose risks to fixed income 
and equity market liquidity by directly and indirectly constraining dealers’ market-making ability. Difficulties in 
meeting prescriptive criteria for permissible market-making may reduce the level of activity that banks are ready to 
 
 
1 See Cellai and Potente (2013). 
2 See HSBC Reserve Management Trends (2014). 
3  “Active” portfolio management by central banks is usually characterised by limited exposure to leveraged trades, and cash bond based 
holding/trading strategies. Provision is made for limited deviations from a benchmark portfolio allocation, with the goal of achieving extra return. 
A fairly tight tracking-error on their investment strategies helps central banks comply with their self-imposed constraint to limit the market impact 
of their trading, thereby reducing any associated reputational risk. Therefore, if compared to industry standards, such an approach often blends 
features of enhanced indexation with those of actual active management. 
4 In September 2014, a survey on a sample of 21 EU central banks was carried out, focusing on active reserve management, with particular 
regard to the approaches adopted for strategic and tactical allocation and investment governance frameworks. For a summary of the main findings, 
see Table 4. 
5 See BIS (2009). 
6 In December 2013, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) approved rules implementing 
Section 619 of the Dodd Frank Act, commonly referred as Volcker Rule. Banking organisations will have until July 2015 to comply fully, with the 
exception of banks “with significant trading activities”, which will be required to specific reporting obligations starting from July 2014. The Volcker 
Rule imposes broad restrictions on proprietary trading and investing in hedge funds and private equity funds by banking organisations and their 
affiliates. Market-making activities are allowed, if conducted in accordance with specific criteria. 
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provide.7  Moreover, the decline in broker-dealer proprietary trading may result in reduced inventories, further 
restricting overall market-making capacity. In a context where reserve managers seek to expand the universe of 
eligible asset classes for diversification, such developments may give cause for concern in that they are detrimental to 
market liquidity and foster volatility, especially in times of market stress. On the other hand, they might also open up 
arbitrage opportunities for those able to take advantage of them. 
 
Last but not least, recent technological innovation has resulted in widespread use of electronic trading platforms 
(ETPs), along with an increase in various trading modalities based on computers directly interfacing with ETPs, 
allowing orders to be placed without immediate human intervention.8 Professional agents of this kind have a structural 
competitive advantage based on this state-of-the-art technology, enabling them to trade more rapidly and perhaps even 
more successfully compared to normal market participants. Such players contribute to higher short-term volatility, 
thus increasing the complexity of central banks’ trading environment. Arguably, these developments, which first 
materialised in equity markets before rapidly spreading to fixed income, may stimulate central banks to enhance 
further trading modalities based on economic fundamentals and slightly longer time horizons. 
 
3. Enhancing the quantitative toolbox: factor models of the term structure 
Much literature exists – from academics and market practitioners – seeking to identify financial and macroeconomic 
risk factors contributing to different yield curve configurations over time. This literature is particularly relevant for 
fixed income portfolio managers as it sheds light on the dynamics of bond returns.  
 
Researchers generally look for factors that persist over time and have compelling explanatory power across a broad 
range of securities and time buckets. In general, such factors consist of any characteristic with respect to a group of 
securities that is deemed important in explaining their returns and risks. Factor models decompose individual asset 
returns into components common to all assets, in addition to a residual component specific to each asset. This approach 
allows for an intuitive attribution of return and risk to the common systematic components, as well as a robust 
calculation of correlations between a relatively small number of factors. A typical fixed income model includes 
common factors such as interest rates and credit spreads, as well as a residual return component that is the result of 
nonǦsystematic idiosyncratic asset characteristics, such as assetǦspecific liquidity. The attributed asset return (also 
referred to as excess return) is calculated by subtracting the predictable return component (due to time variance) from 
the price return. The following diagram shows the hierarchical decomposition of security excess return. 
 
 
 
 
7 See O Wyman, “The Volcker Rule restrictions on proprietary trading – Implications for market liquidity”, 2012: and US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Division of Investment Management, “Guidance Update – Risk Management in changing fixed income market conditions”, 
January 2014. 
8 See Credit Suisse, Sizing Up US Equity Microstructure, April 2010; and Hendershott et al (2011). 
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Interest rate factors can be considered key rates on the term structure. However, since rates are highly correlated, 
this introduces more factors than are necessary to explain a very high fraction of the variance of all the rates (greater 
than 95% in most cases; Littermann and Scheinkman (1991)). Using economically meaningful factors that represent 
a common change for all the rates – specifically shift, twist and butterfly (STB) – reduces the sources of risk without 
sacrificing accuracy. STB factors represent, respectively, vertical movements of all rates, the steepening and flattening 
of the yield curve, and changes in curvature. Exposures to STB factors are analogous to duration risk exposure in 
cases where the interest rate shock is equivalent to a unit change in the level, steepness and curvature (LSC) of the 
term structure.  
 
In principle, the number of factors used as predictor variables can significantly affect the results of the analysis. 
For example, Illmanen (1995) uses four factors: term spread, real yield, inverse wealth and momentum. The advantage 
of this approach is that the bond returns can be directly related to specific financial variables. Cochrane and Piazzesi 
(2008), on the other hand, use only one factor – expressed as a linear combination of yields or forward capturing all 
of the economically interesting variation in one-year of expected excess for bonds of all maturities. As a final example, 
Kim and Wright (2005) fit a three factor constant volatility model to weekly bond data to decompose observed yield 
and forward curves into expectations of future interest rates and risk premia. Empirical results are different, mixed 
and time-varying. Furthermore, the quality of the results depends on the point of the curve chosen as dependent 
variables.  
 
3.1. Linear affine model of the term structure and bond risk premia 
Affine models of the term structure of interest rates are popular tools used in analysing bond pricing. The 
exponential affine framework – see Duffie and Kan (1996) and Dai and Singleton (2000) – is arguably the dominant 
one in term structure literature. The models typically start with three assumptions: the pricing kernel is exponentially 
affine in the shocks that drive the economy; prices of risk are affine in the state variables; and innovations to state 
variables (eg risk factors) and log yield observation errors are conditionally Gaussian.9 These assumptions give rise 
to yields that are affine in the state variables and whose coefficients on the state variables are subject to constraints 
across maturities.10 
 
One attractive feature of the framework is that it accommodates negative interest rates, which is very relevant under 
current market conditions.11 Another attractive feature is that the martingale component of the factor process does not 
affect the bond spot yield curve. This implies that one can easily allow for factors that affect prices of interest rate 
derivatives without affecting bond prices, namely risk factors that are not spanned by the cross-section of yields (eg 
unspanned risk factors). Assuming that the factor process has diffusive dynamics, the state vector can be partitioned 
into two kinds of factors that affect the bond yield curve (the term structure of interest rates): factors that affect interest 
rate volatility but not the term structure (unspanned stochastic volatility, or USV, factors); and those that neither affect 
the spot yield curve (the term structure) nor interest rate volatility, but may nevertheless indirectly impact the interest 
rate derivative pricing. Perhaps even more importantly, unspanned risk factors would have an almost imperceptible 
effect on the cross section of yields (yield curve), while displaying a strong forecast power for bond (holding period) 
returns and short-term interest rates (Duffee (2009)).   
 
In this framework, the recently introduced class of linear-rational term structure models (Filipovic et al (2014)) can 
improve the standard exponential-affine class of model, as it accommodates restrictions on interest rate levels and the 
 
 
9 See Chen and Scott (1993); Dai and Singleton (2000); Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2002); Duffee (2002); Kim and Wright (2005). 
10 For overviews, see Duffie and Kan (1996); Piazzesi (2003); Singleton (2006). 
11 The model also can replicate important features of term structure dynamics at the zero lower bound. Consistently with the data, the model 
may generate extended periods of near-zero short rates as well as highly asymmetric distributions of future short rates, with the most likely value 
of future short rates being significantly lower than the mean value. 
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presence of USV factors, while admitting analytical solutions to interest rates derivative, such as caplets, floorlets and 
swaptions.  
 
Traditional estimation methods for affine term structure models have often treated pricing factors as latent variables 
that are backed out from observed yields using filtering or observation equation inversion techniques. In following 
Adrian et al (2013), our estimation approach is different in that it requires the pricing (risk) factors to be observed. 
Some authors – Joslin, Singleton and Zhu (JSZ, 2011) and Diez de los Rios (2013) – argue that internal consistency 
needs to be imposed on the model parameters if the principal components (PC) of the yields are used as pricing factors 
to ensure that the model implied equals the actual principal components. It is worth noting that these consistency 
restrictions only hold if all model factors represent linear combinations of yields. This is a fairly restrictive assumption, 
as it would be desirable to include the model risk factors constructed from non-yield data that do not need to be 
subjected to these restrictions. In contrast with the JSZ model, our approach does not require pricing factors to be 
linear combinations of yields. Therefore, it can also be readily applied to models that use observable and economically 
interpretable pricing (risk) factors such as macroeconomic variables and investors’ sentiment indicators (or some 
summary statistics based on an aggregation of them). 
 
Term premia are of economic interest to market participants because they allow inference from the expectation of 
the path of future short-term interest rates. They are also of special interest to fixed income portfolio managers in that 
they are a crucial determinant of bond holding period return. However, the relationship between future interest rates 
and bond risk premia can be subtle, as risk factors that drive risk premia and expected short rates in opposite directions 
can have arbitrarily small effects on the cross section of yields (yield curve), yet large effects on yield dynamics. 
Consider, for example, economic news that raises risk premia and simultaneously leads investors to believe the US 
Federal Reserve will soon cut short-term interest rates. The increase in risk premia induces an immediate increase in 
long-term bond yields, while the expected drop in short-term rates induces an immediate decrease in these yields. 
These offsetting effects could be leaving the current term structure – but not the expected future term structures – 
unaffected by the news. 
 
Recent models of the yield curve have featured unspanned factors12 that do not affect the dynamics of bonds under 
the pricing (risk-neutral) measure, but do affect them under the historical measure (see Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton 
(JPZ, 2012), Duffee (2011) and Wright (2011)). The predictability under the historical measure is consistent with 
recent academic papers finding that macroeconomic factors have forecasting power for bond returns (see Moench 
(2008) and Ludvigson and Ng (2009)). The assumption that a given risk factor does not affect the cross section of 
bond yields under the pricing measure can be implemented by imposing certain restrictions on a set of model 
parameters. 
 
We illustrate the framework of an affine term structure model with a set of risk factors that can span the risk return 
space with suitable trading strategies (risk factors that can price the term structure of interest rates). In addition, we 
also consider predictive variables that may be unspanned by the priced risk factors. This specification can be related 
to the approach laid out in JPS (2012) and Adrian et al (2013). This model features as pricing factors the first three 
and five principal components of treasury bond yields. In addition, we extend the range of risk factors to sentiment 
indicators. We also test whether these additional variables command risk premia, as they drive future bond returns 
and may impact the spot term structure of interest rates. We want to focus specifically on market sentiment indicators, 
which, to our knowledge, have not been studied as a risk factor; they may provide additional insights on the yield 
curve and dynamics of bond returns, and as additional state variables that can have a predictive power for bond returns. 
It is conceivable that other measures of perceived bond market risk – such as indicators of political uncertainty – might 
 
 
12 Unspanned risk factors do not produce contemporaneous effects (or they produce only negligible contemporaneous effects) on expected 
excess returns. However, they might affect the dynamic of other risk factors (spanned), by also altering the compensation required by the investors 
for the exposures to spanned factors.  
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also be worth investigating along the same lines. 
 
Markets react to the release of new information differently, based on its perception about future developments of 
the macroeconomic situation or risk aversion. Furthermore, other things being equal, the behaviour of bond prices 
may be affected by the positioning of market players characterised by a more pronounced speculative attitude. Several 
scenarios may be brought forward in this regard: it is easy to argue, for example, that the release of a poor GDP figure 
in the United States will have a different impact on the US 10-year yield based on: 
 
x the degree of over/under confidence of market participants about the general economic situation;  
x the trading positions of speculative players; and 
x the level of investors’ risk aversion. 
 
Consequently, a thorough analysis of such market sentiment indicators should be conducted to test the information 
content of bond excess return. We propose an approach aimed at integrating traditional risk factors with market 
sentiment indicators. 
 
Our model is based on three market sentiment indicators. The first one is the economic surprise index, which tracks 
the surprise of economic releases versus market expectations. Stronger-than-expected data positively affects the index, 
depending, to some extent, on the importance of the data. Such importance is measured by the volatility that the release 
of the data creates on fixed income markets; eg a series of better than expected data may determine an over-optimistic 
environment, driving up expectations and increasing the probability of an unexpected bad surprise, in which the impact 
on securities prices is likely to be high. The second market sentiment indicator is the positioning of speculative 
operators; when most of the speculative market is positioned on the short or long side, the effect of specific events 
may prove higher due to market squeezes. The final indicator used in our model is a comprehensive risk aversion 
index, whose market impact tends to be procyclical in that high risk aversion magnifies the impact of bad news on 
prices while weakening that of good. Low risk aversion in this regard has the opposite effect. 
 
3.2. Econometric model of the term structure of interest rates 
We assume that the dynamics of a vector of risk factors, Xt, evolve according to the following vector auto-
regression (VAR) model: 
 ܺ௧ାଵ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߔܺ௧ ൅ ߭௧ାଵ
ɓ୲ାଵ̱ሺͲǡ ȭ௫ሻ                                                                                                                                                     (1) 
where μ is a constant parameter vector and Φ is a constant parameter matrix. ߭௧ାଵ denotes the vector of shocks to the 
risk factors and σ௫ its variance-covariance matrix. We denote P(n)t the (zero coupon) treasury bond price with maturity 
n at time t. The assumption of no-arbitrage implies (see Dybvig and Ross (1987)) that there exists a pricing kernel 
Mt+1 such that,  
 
 ௧ܲ
ሺ௡ሻ ൌ ܧ௧ሾܯ௧ାଵ ௧ܲାଵሺ௡ିଵሻሿ                                                                                                                                     (2) 
 
We further assume that the pricing kernel (stochastic discount factor), Mt+1, is exponentially affine: 
 
ܯ௧ାଵ ؠ ܧݔ݌ ቀെݎ௧ െ ଵଶ ɉ௧ήᇱ ߣ௧ െ ߣ௧ήᇱ ȭ௫
ିଵ ଶΤ ߭௧ାଵቁ                                                                                               (3) 
 
where ݎ௧ ൌ െ݈݊ ௧ܲሺଵሻ is the continuously compounded risk-free rate. We further assume that the market price of 
103 R. Violi et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  29 ( 2015 )  96 – 121 
risk function is of the essentially affine form as suggested in Duffee (2002), 
 
ߣ௧ ؠ ȭ௫ିଵ ଶΤ ሾߣ଴ ൅ ߣଵܺ௧]                                                                                                                                       (4) 
 
where λ0 is a vector of constant parameters and ߣଵ is a square matrix of constant parameters with dimension dictated 
by the number of risk factors included in ܺ௧.  
 
We indicate as ݎݔ௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ  the (log) excess holding period return of a bond with n tenor: 
 
ݎݔ௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ ؠ ݈݊ ௧ܲାଵሺ௡ሻ െ ݈݊ ௧ܲሺ௡ାଵሻ െ ݎ௧                                                                                                                           (5) 
 
Following Adrian et al (2013), we can write the return generating process for log excess holding period returns as 
 
ݎݔ௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ ൌ ߚ௧ሺ௡ሻ
ᇲൣߣ଴ ൅ ߣଵܺ௧ െ ͲǤͷȭ௫ߚ௧ሺ௡ሻ ൅ ݒ௧ାଵ൧ െ ͲǤͷߪଶ ൅ ݁௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ                                                                           (6) 
  
With 
 
       ߚ௧ሺ௡ሻᇱ ؠ ܥ݋ݒ௧ൣݎݔ௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ Ǣ ݒԢ௧ାଵ൧ȭ௫ି ଵ                                                                                                                              (7) 
 
where the return pricing errors ݁௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ  are assumed to be conditionally independently and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.) with constant variance, ߪଶ. We also assume that factor loadings (7) are constant over time13, 
 
ߚ௧ሺ௡ሻ ൌ ߚሺ௡ሻ                                                                                                                                                        (7’) 
 
Stacking this system across maturities and time periods, equation (6) can be rewritten as 
 
ݎݔ ൌ ߚᇱሾߣ଴݅ᇱ் ൅ ߣଵܺିሿ െ ͲǤͷሾܤݒ݁ܿሺȭ௫ሻ ൅ ߪଶ݅ேሿ݅ᇱ் ൅ ߚᇱܸ ൅ ܧ                                                                    (8) 
 
where rx is a ܰ ൈ ܶ matrix, ߚ ؠ ሾߚሺଵሻǡ ߚሺଶሻǡ ǥ ǡ ߚሺேሻሿ is a ܭ ൈ ܰ matrix of factor loadings, ்݅ and ݅ே are a ܶ ൈ
ͳ and ܰ ൈ ͳ vectors of ones, ܺି ؠ ሾܺ଴ǡ ଵܺǡ ǥǡ ்ܺିଵሿ is a  ܭ ൈ ܶ matrix of risk factors lagged one period, 
 
ܤ ؠ ሾݒ݁ܿሺߚሺଵሻߚሺଵሻᇲሻǡ ݒ݁ܿሺߚሺଶሻߚሺଶሻᇲሻǡ ǥǡ ݒ݁ܿሺߚሺேሻߚሺேሻᇲሻ]Ԣ  
 
is an ܰ ൈܭଶ matrix, V is a ܭ ൈ ܶ matrix, which contains the innovations to the risk factors, ߭௧ାଵ, and E is an 
ܰ ൈ ܶ matrix with the return pricing errors, ݁௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ .  
 
In order to estimate the set of (price of) risk parameters ሾߣ଴ǡ ߣଵሿ, it is useful to introduce the following OLS style 
linear projection matrix based on the factor loadings, ߚ 
 
ܪఉ ؠ ሺߚߚᇱሻିଵߚ                                                                                                                                                 (9) 
 
so that we can transform eq (8) into a Seemingly Unrelated Equation (SUR) model with linear regressors,  
ሾ݅ᇱ்ǡ ܺିሿ  and coefficients, ሾߣ଴ǡ ߣଵሿ , by multiplying both side of eq (8) by ܪఉ 
 
ݎݔఉ ൌ ߣ଴݅Ԣ் ൅ ߣଵܺି ൅ ܧఉ                                                                                                                               (10) 
 
 
13 It is left for future research to relax the assumption of constant factor loadings. 
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with  
 
ݎݔఉ ؠ ܪఉݎݔ ൅ ͲǤͷܪఉሾܤݒ݁ܿሺȭ௫ሻ ൅ ߪଶ݅ேሿ݅ᇱ் െ ܸǢܧఉ ؠ ܪఉܧ                                                                 (10’) 
 
3.3. Maximal Sharpe ratios and the investment opportunity set of portfolio strategies  
The linear affine model of the term structure gives us a reasonably simple way to construct maximum (conditional) 
Sharpe ratio (MSHR). In particular, Gaussian models give a clean interpretation of the model-implied conditional 
Sharpe ratios. Because the models rule out time variation in conditional covariances, model-implied Sharpe ratios are 
best thought of as expected excess returns divided by average standard deviations. MSHR is a typical tool for assessing 
risk-adjusted performance in a classic asset allocation exercise and is also a valuable indicator, in a dynamic setting, 
for examining the variation in investment opportunities. It could also provide a good sanity check in a model 
evaluation exercise; for example, very high model implied MSHR levels are likely to raise questions about the 
practical relevance of such a model.  
 
The Sharpe ratio is maximised for a hypothetical return to a portfolio of bonds that replicates the payoff to the log 
pricing kernel (stochastic discount factor) exactly. The model-implied maximal Sharpe ratio (SHR) therefore 
corresponds to14 
 
௪೟ ሺܵܪܴሻ ൌ ඥܸܽݎ௧ሾܮ݋݃ሺܯ௧ାଵሻሿ ൌ ඥɉ௧
ᇱ ߣ௧                                                                                             (11)  
where wt is the optimal portfolio maximising the Sharpe ratio and  λt  is the price of risk factors. The expected 
excess return to an n-period bond from t to t + 1 can be derived from eq (6) and it is given by 
 
ሺ௡ሻሺሻ ؠ ߚሺ௡ሻᇱൣߣ଴ ൅ ߣଵܺ௧ െ ͲǤͷȭ௫ߚሺ௡ሻ൧ െ ͲǤͷߪଶ                                               (12) 
 
It should be noted that expected excess returns the time-varying component of the excess return to  
Time-Varying ̴ܧܧܴሺ௡ሻ ؠ ߚሺ௡ሻᇱߣଵܺ௧                                                                                                                (13) 
which shows that changes in the risk factors – weighted by the price of risk parameters,  λ1, and the factor loadings, 
β(n-1) – are the drivers of the time-varying expected bond return.  
 
The maximal Sharpe ratio provides a useful diagnostic of the validity of the stochastic discount factor specification 
assumed in the model. Duffee (2010) argues that certain (linear affine) factor models of the term structure can give 
rise to excessively high maximal Sharpe ratios due to over-fitting. A reasonable set of parameter estimates should 
avoid unrealistic Sharpe ratio levels. In this case, MSHR could provide a useful indicator about the investment 
opportunity set available to portfolio managers. As a risk-adjusted performance measure, MSHR also decomposes the 
contribution of each risk factor to the overall performance. This is a useful tool for active trading strategies aimed at 
timing the changes in the level of risk premia. 
 
 
3.4. Estimation procedure 
 
 
 
14 See also Adrian et al (2013).  
105 R. Violi et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  29 ( 2015 )  96 – 121 
In our baseline specifications, we use linear combinations of log yields (such as principal components) as 
observable factors Xt and estimate the model parameters using holding period returns based on the same set of yields. 
We follow Adrian et al (2013) and we proceed with the assumption that the factor loading matrix, β, is constant. 
We estimate eq (1) via ordinary least squares achieving a decomposition of Xt+1 into a predictable component and 
an estimate of the factor innovation  ݒ௧ାଵכ . We recombine these innovations into the matrix, ܸכ for an estimate of the 
state variable variance-covariance matrix15, 
ȭ௫כ ൌ ܸכܸכᇱ ܶΤ                                                                                                                                                  (14) 
In the second step we regress excess returns on a set of pricing factors lagged one period and a set of 
contemporaneous risk factor innovations – with a constant added – according to the following transformation of eq 
(8) 
ݎݔ ൌ ܽ݅Ԣ் ൅ߚᇱܸכ ൅ ܿܺି ൅ ܧ                                                                                                                        (15) 
With 
 
ܽ ؠ ሾߚᇱߣ଴ െ ͲǤͷሺܤݒ݁ܿሺȭ௫ሻ ൅ߪଶ݅ேሻ݅ᇱ்Ǣ ܿ ؠ ߚԢߣଵ  
 
Collecting the regressors into the ሺʹܭ ൅ ͳሻݔܶ  matrix ܼכ ؠ ሾ்݅ǡ ܸכᇲǡ ܺିሿԢ, the OLS estimators become 
ሾܽכǡ ߚכᇱǡ ܿכሿ ൌ ݎݔܼכᇲ൫ܼכܼכᇲ൯ିଵ                                                                                                                        (16) 
Next we collect the residuals from this regression into the N × T matrix  ܧכ.  We then estimate 
ߪכଶ ൌ ݐݎ൫ܧכܧכᇲ൯ ܰܶΤ    
with: ܧכ ؠ ݎݔ െ ሾܽכǡ ߚכᇱǡ ܿכሿܼכ 
 
We construct B* from the estimates, β*, and we proceed to estimating the price of risk parameters   [λ0   λ1] via the 
cross-sectional regression (10), using the following eq (10’) estimate, 
ݎݔఉכ ൌ ܪఉכݎݔ ൅ ͲǤͷܪఉכሾܤכݒ݁ܿሺȭ௫כሻ ൅ߪכଶ݅ேሿ݅Ą் െ ܸכ                                                     
(17) 
we can then implement the multivariate (SUR  type) regression model (10) with  ሾ݅Ԣ்ǡ ܺିሿ as identical regressors 
in each of the K equations, 
ݎݔఉכ ൌ ߣ଴݅Ԣ் ൅ ߣଵܺି ൅ ܧఉ                                                                                                                              (18) 
In the third and final step we estimate the λ0 and λ1 estimate parameters in compact form: 
Ȧ ൌ ሺܹᇱȳିଵܹሻିଵܹᇱȳିଵܴ ఉܺ                                                                                                                     (19) 
Where:  
 
 
15 For a detailed presentation of a regression-based approach using a linear pricing kernel specification, see Adrian et al 
(2013).  
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Ȧ ൌ ൣߣ଴ǡଵǡ ߣଵǡଵǡ ǥ ǡ ߣ଴ǡ௄ǡ ߣଵǡ௄൧ሺܭ ൅ ͳሻܭ ൈ ͳ  
 ఉܺ ൌ ൣݎݔఉǡଵכᇲ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݎݔఉǡ௞כᇲ ൧ܶܭ ൈ ͳ         
ܺכ ൌ ൣ்݅ǡ ܺିᇲ൧ܶ ൈ ሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻ       and      ܹ ൌ ሾܫ௄Ǣ ܺכሿܶܭ ൈ ሺܭ ൅ ͳሻܭ 
ȳ ൌ ൣ൫ܪఉכ ȭாܪఉכᇲ൯Ǣ ܫ்൧ܶܭ ൈ ܶܭ        and     ȭா ൌ ܧܧԢ ܶΤ ܰ ൈ ܰ        
 
This is GLS representation where the covariance error matrix depends on the second step. Due to identical 
regressors, this representation is the same as the OLS equation by equation strategy.16   
 
3.5. Empirical results 
In this section, we provide estimation results for a number of econometric specifications. We use the principal 
components of treasury yields as our basic set of risk factors in modeling US Treasury bond returns. Early research 
by Scheinkman and Litterman (1991) points out that three factors are enough to explain the cross-sectional variation 
of yields. More recent papers, such as Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005, 2008) and Duffee (2011), and emphasise the 
importance of additional factors to explain treasury returns. We therefore choose  K=3 and K=5 factor specifications 
as our baseline examples. We also estimate models with additional risk factors, adding to the yield-based set of risk 
factors two macroeconomic variables and a proxy for investors’ sentiment indicator. All in all, we investigate five 
estimated versions of the model according to the following structure of risk factors: 
x 3 principal component implied by bond yield curve changes (YCC factors: Level, Slope, and Curvature; LSC)  
x 5 principal component implied by bond yield curve changes (3 LSC factors + 2; 5 YCC factors)  
x 5 YCC  factors + 1 sentiment indicator 
x 3 YCC Factors + 2 macroeconomic variable 
x 3 YCC factors + 2 macroeconomic variable + 1 sentiment indicator 
 Taking as given the set of risk factors included in each of the five model specifications, we estimate the main 
parameter (Ԅǡ ȭ௫ǡ ߪǡ ߚǡ ߣ଴ǡ ߣଵሻ  using the approach described above. We discuss estimation results for various 
specifications in the next section.  
  Concerning term structure data, all estimated models use bond returns computed from constant maturity 
(coupon paying) government securities from the set of constant maturity treasury yields published in the Federal 
Reserve Board (H.15 release). We use a cross section of yields for maturities n = 12, 24, 36, 60, 84, 120, 240 months. 
From these yields we extract their principal components. We calculate holding period returns for a hypothetical set of 
par coupon bonds based on the chosen yield dataset with a full revaluation method.  
 Taking as the risk-free rate the n = 1 month bill yield, rt, and subtracting it to each holding period return, it 
gives us the cross section of excess returns for N = 7 maturities, 
ݎݔ௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ ؠ ݎ௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ െ ݎ௧                                                                                                                          (20) 
Also, we use the time changes of yield to maturity to compute 3 and 5 first principle components that are used as 
risk factors in our set of estimated models. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of the observed holding periods’ 
excess returns based on the set of constant maturity yields adopted for our estimates. 
 
 
16 See, for instance, Greene, 7th edition, paragraph 10.2.2.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 1 year 2 year 3 year 5 year 7 year 10 year 20 year 
Mean 0.05% 0.09% 0.14% 0.21% 0.28% 0.35% 0.51% 
Std 0.19% 0.42% 0.67% 1.12% 1.53% 1.93% 2.88% 
Skewness 1.4422 0.395 0.0217 –0.052 0.1242 0.63432 1.03937 
Min –0.38% –0.97% –1.59% –2.69% –3.95% –5.14% –7.04% 
Max 0.79% 1.33% 1.92% 3.95% 6.38% 10.18% 16.45% 
All models are estimated over the sample period August 2001–August 2014, which provides a total of T = 157 
monthly observations. Following the empirical evidence for yield risk factors based on 3 and 5 principal components, 
we estimate the set of predictive equations and test for the significance of the associated risk factor pricing coefficients, 
[λ0   λ1]. We compute observed, fitted and expected excess returns time series for each maturity. Fitted returns are 
given by  
ߚכᇱሺߣ଴כ ݅Ԣ் ൅ ߣଵכܺି ൅ ܸכሻ െ ͲǤͷሾܤݒ݁ܿሺȭ௫ሻ ൅ ߪଶ݅ேሿ݅Ԣ்                                                                                    (21) 
which includes risk factor levels, X-, as well as their innovations, V*. However, the expected excess returns 
measure,  
ߚכᇱሺߣ଴כ ݅Ԣ் ൅ ߣଵכܺିሻ െ ͲǤͷሾܤݒ݁ܿሺȭ௫ሻ ൅ ߪଶ݅ேሿ݅Ԣ்                                                                                           (22) 
excludes the innovations to the risk factor, V*, as their expected value is zero. In both fitted and expected returns 
factor loadings matrix, β*’, weights the price of risk component,  
ሺߣ଴כ ݅Ԣ் ൅ ߣଵכܺିሻ                                                                                                                                                (23) 
While the convexity adjustment term  
െͲǤͷሾܤݒ݁ܿሺȭ௫ሻ ൅ ߪଶ݅ேሿ݅Ԣ்                                                                                                                            (24) 
can be ignored for all practical purposes as it is likely to be small.  
Charts (1) and (2) report observed, fitted and expected returns for the 7-year constant maturity bond based on the 
3 and 5 risk factors model. In both cases, they display a very high level of (in sample) fitting with an R2 statistics of 
around 98-99%. 
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Chart 1 
 
 
Chart 2 
Not surprisingly, expected returns are much less close to actual returns than fitted returns, as the latter incorporates 
risk factor innovations, which are very important drivers of holding period bond returns. Moreover, expected returns 
are far less volatile than realised returns. Both econometric specifications fit the cross section of returns nearly 
perfectly and give rise to substantial time variation in the prices of risk. All in all, the term premia implied by the 
expected returns show a significant predictability component embodied in the risk factors’ time variation: taken 
together their variability over time can account for 5-7% of excess returns variability as measured by the reported R2 
statistics. The 3 and 5 bond yield-based risk factors turn out to be priced risk factors, as their risk parameters [λ0   λ1] 
are statistically significant; however, this happens with a clear-cut outcome only for the 3 factor (LSC) version of the 
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model, while the evidence regarding the additional 2 yield based factor over and above LSC is less strong.17. Charts 
(3) and (4) plot the Maximal Sharpe ratio (MSHR) associated with the 3 and 5 bond yield risk factors model 
specifications. As they are priced, time-varying risk factor premia are positive and fluctuating over time.  
 
Chart 3 (3 YCC factor model) 
 
Chart 4 (5 YCC factor model) 
 
 
 
17 A full set of statistical tests for all models is available from the authors upon request. 
110   R. Violi et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  29 ( 2015 )  96 – 121 
The estimated MSHR tends to oscillate around 0.55 for the 3 factor YCC model and around 1 for the 5 YCC factor 
model (their respective sample average), with a few temporary spikes above 2 and 3 around the time of recession 
and/or financial crisis, such as around September 2001 and during the 2007-08 bursting phase of the 2007 financial 
crisis. These occurred at times when the Fed was in the process of drastically changing its policy stance in the face of 
very significant negative macroeconomic shocks. While showing some similarity in their dynamic pattern, the average 
MSHR across these models shows a tangible difference, as the 5 factor model almost doubled the level of risk-adjusted 
expected returns compared to the 3 factor model. This large difference in expected risk-adjusted return across models 
might be driven, at least in part, by treating the additional fourth and fifth factors as spanned factors. However, at least 
in principle, even if additional factors 4 and 5 have a minor impact on the yield curve, they can add a fairly large value 
to the pursuit of active trading strategies trying to chase time-varying risk premia of the term structure by choosing a 
suitable portfolio of bonds with different maturities and adjusting its composition over time.   
The horizontal line reported in the charts in green represents the special case of time-invariant expected returns 
with constant risk (term) premia, which is obtained by setting,  
ߣଵכ ൌ Ͳ                                                                                                                                                              (24) 
Eq (24) is equivalent to the restriction implied by the generalised expectations hypothesis of the term structure 
(GEHTS; Sangvinatsos and Wachter (2005)), whereby term premia are assumed to be constant. The estimated MSHR 
in this case equals 0.2 for the 3 yield-based factor model and 0.4 for the 5-yield-based factor model. While the 
restriction (24) is strongly rejected by the data, it provides a useful benchmark for gauging the investment opportunity 
set (eg trading strategies) available to investors as they rely on the predictability of priced risk-factors in their attempt 
to time bond term premia. Interestingly, the MSHR indicator for both models shows a declining trend after the 2009 
recovery in the United States, moving closer to its floor given by a constant level of the term premium. Hence, at this 
juncture the GEHTS may provide a realistic description of the risk priced by the current term structure of interest 
rates.  
We now move on to models where we include macroeconomic indicators for consumer price inflation and 
economic growth as well as a proxy for investor sentiment in our set of risk factors. Recent models of the yield curve 
have featured unspanned factors that do not affect the dynamics of bonds under the pricing measure, but do affect 
them under the historical measure (see JPS (2012); Duffee (2011); Wright (2011) and Adrian et al (2013)). According 
to the empirical evidence reported in this literature, it is not always clear if these variables can be treated as a priced 
risk factor. The assumption that a given risk factor does not affect bond yields under the pricing measure can be 
implemented by imposing the restriction that the corresponding elements of ሾߚሺ௡ሻǡ ݊ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ ܰሿ be exactly equal to 
zero. Under the assumptions we made in Section 3.2, one can show that bond prices are exponentially affine in the 
vector of state variables: 
݈݊ ௧ܲሺ௡ାଵሻ ൌ ܣ௡ାଵ ൅ ߚሺ௡ାଵሻᇱܺ௧ ൅ ݑ௧ሺ௡ାଵሻ   
From the equation (5), it follows        
 ܣ௡ାଵ ൌ ܣ௡ ൅ ߚሺ௡ሻᇲሺߤ െ ߣ଴ሻ ൅ ͲǤͷ൫ߚሺ௡ሻᇲȭ௫ߚሺ௡ሻ ൅ ߪଶ൯ ൅ܣଵ 
ߚሺ௡ାଵሻᇱ ൌ ߚሺ௡ሻᇲሺ߶ െ ߣଵሻ ൅ ߚሺଵሻᇱ                                                                                                                      (25) 
valid starting from n=1, whereas ܣ଴ ൌ Ͳǡ ܤ଴ ൌ Ͳǡ ܣଵ ൌ െߜ଴ǡ ܤଵ ൌ െߜଵ 
with the following expression for the log bond pricing errors, 
ݑ௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ െ ݑ௧ሺ௡ାଵሻ ൅ ݑ௧ሺଵሻ ൌ ݁௧ାଵሺ௡ሻ                                          ( 25’) 
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recalling that ݎ௧ ൌ െ݈݊ ௧ܲሺଵሻ ൌ െܣଵ െ ߚሺଵሻᇲܺ௧ െ ݑ௧ሺଵሻ   
ݎ௧ ൌ ߜ଴൅ߜଵԢܺ௧ ൅ ݑ௧ሺଵሻ, which represents the equation describing the dynamic of the short-term rate as a function of 
risk factors. 
According to statistical tests reported in the literature, risk factors are thought to be unspanned if their loadings on 
the yield curve do not reject the null hypothesis that 
ߚ ؠ ൣߚሺௌ௉ሻǢ ߚሺ௎ௌሻ൧ǡ ߚሺ௎ௌሻ ൌ Ͳ                                                                                                                          (26) 
where the superscript US indicates the set of parameters associated with the risk factors subject to the unspanning 
test (unspanned risk factors), while the superscript SP corresponds to the set of factor loading for the spanned risk 
factors. If restriction (26) is not rejected, the corresponding factors are irrelevant for bond pricing – ie they do not 
contribute to the shape of the term structure of interest rates.   
Restriction (26) is also important for the price of risk parameter estimates, [λ0   λ1], as witnessed by the second step 
of our estimation procedure (see eq 17-19’). Such estimates determine the MSHR indicator measurement. More 
specifically, the issue here is how the restriction (26) has an impact on identifying the price of risk parameters 
corresponding to the unspanned risk factor. We can conveniently complement the pricing implications of restriction 
(26) by testing the null hypothesis that certain rows/columns of [λ0   λ1] are equal to zero for unspanned risk factors. 
Operationally, we can proceed by introducing a suitable decomposition for the price of risk matrix, [λ0   λ1] by 
distinguishing the spanned versus the unspanned price of risk factors as follows: 
ሾߣ଴ߣଵሿ ൌ ቈɉ଴
ௌ ɉଵௌௌ ߣଵௌ௎
ߣ଴௎ ߣଵ௎ௌ ߣଵ௎௎቉                                                                                                                             (27) 
One possible way to tackle the identification problem with matrix (27) would be to effectively set to zero the lower 
rows of the price of risk parameters – corresponding to the unspanned risk factors – without imposing any a priori 
restrictions to the upper right block of λ1  
ߣ଴௎ ൌ Ͳǡ ߣଵ௎ௌ ൌ0 , ߣଵ௎௎ ൌ Ͳǡ ߣଵௌ௎ ് Ͳ                                                                                                                 (28) 
where ߣଵௌ௎corresponds to the price of risk in the set of spanned risk factors induced by the exposure to the set of 
unspanned factors. However, the recursion scheme for the factor loadings β in eq (25) and the restriction (26) for the 
unspanned factor also requires that: 
ߣଵௌ௎ ൌ ߔௌ௎                                                                                                                                                       (28’) 
We test restrictions (26) for all our specifications, with the exception of the 5 yield-based risk factor model. We 
summarise our results in Table 2 for all models. Our main conclusions regarding the risk factors classification are as 
follows:   
The LSC risk factor model is considered only as having spanned and (fully) priced risk factors by the bond yield 
curve (we do not run any tests about the hypothesis of unspanned risk factors in the specification with 5 PC risk 
factors). 
x The YCC 5 (3 LSC + 2) risk factor model possibly has 2 unspanned risk factors (corresponding to the fourth and 
fifth principal component implied by the bond yield curve). 
x The set of macroeconomic risk factors does not reject the null hypothesis of being classified as unspanned risk 
factors. 
x The investor sentiment risk factor does not reject the null hypothesis of being classified as an unspanned risk factor. 
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Table 2: Risk factors 
 Rq fit Rq exp PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 SENTIMENT PCE CFNAI 
3 PC 0.9842 0.0564 S S S      
3 PC+2 MACRO 0.9845 0.0748 S S S    U U 
5 PC * 0.9940 0.0715 S S S S S    
5 PC + SENT 0.9940 0.1423 S S S U U U   
3 PC + 2 MACR + SENTIMENT 0.9847 0.1576 S S S   U U U 
(*) In this model specification the 2 additional YCC factors – over and above the 3 LSC factors - are assumed to be spanned   
It is worth noting that unspanned risk factors can provide useful information for asset pricing models whose main 
goal is to account for the time-varying components driving expected returns. More specifically, the fact that unspanned 
risk factors do not impact the bond yield curve do not make them redundant as far as bond returns are concerned. As 
discussed above, this is a fairly subtle point in the identification process that is not well understood in the literature, 
but has important practical implications for active portfolio managers.    
In our sample data, the set of unspanned risk factors includes the set of macroeconomic variables and the investor 
sentiment indicator (Table 1). As far as the R2 measure is concerned, investor sentiment has significant impact as it 
doubles its level to over 14%; the set of macroeconomic variables shows a very model additional effect (R2 just over 
15%). They seem to provide a tangible improvement in the MSHR indicators (risk-adjusted potential performance), 
as its average increases from 0.55 to 0.75 when measured again the 3 risk factor LSC model. 
 
Chart 5 (3 YCC risk factors + 2 macro variables + 1 investor sentiment indicator) 
Finally, in order to draw operational signals (long/short duration) from the model estimates, a multifactor 
quantitative indicator (MQI) is elaborated below, with a view to feed it into a scorecard approach.  
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As our model provides an estimate of expected excess returns, a positive excess return could signal a long duration 
period, assuming that the financing cost of the long position in the portfolio equals the 1-month bill return (by contrast, 
a negative excess return points to a short duration position). A simple and intuitive way to construct the MQI could 
be as follows: a tenor that is relevant for the portfolio (eg seven years) is selected and the expected excess return 
provided by the model is divided by its rolling standard deviation, so as to standardise the figure. The value can be 
left unconstrained or capped in a desired range [–2, +2]. The first option would assign a greater significance to the 
indicator, compared to other factors used in the scorecard proposed below. 
 ൌ ாாோ௦௧ௗሺாாோሻ                                                                                                                                                      (29) 
 
4. Integrating quantitative and qualitative information into a central bank’s active management process: a 
scorecard approach 
Whereas quantitative indicators may seem invaluable for taking into account market uncertainty, they nevertheless 
have drawbacks; fully automated decision-making processes tend to be profitable over very short time horizons, often 
as a consequence of market inefficiencies. As time horizons lengthen, however, sudden and significant changes in the 
set of available information become more likely, thereby undermining the ability of quantitative indicators to support 
the search for stable extra performance. On the other hand, qualitative assessments involve a degree of subjectivity, 
reflecting each individual’s evaluation of available information, which may be biased by personal opinions or 
behavioural factors. This judgmental element may, of course, be reduced by means of a structured process selecting 
the inputs of qualitative assessments (eg recourse to consensus data, professional forecasts). 
In this context, a scorecard approach can be useful in minimising many discretion-related weaknesses intrinsic to 
purely qualitative approaches, and in allowing scope for an effective combination of quantitative and qualitative input, 
blending different signals into an operational indicator. Furthermore, scorecards could represent a means for 
reconciling diverging signals and supporting collegial decision-making by fostering a consensus to converge on 
scorecard input variables as well as on weightings. 
In Table 3 below, we provide an example of a three-section scorecard that combines the information derived from 
the affine model (as described above) with qualitative elements, producing a comprehensive indicator suitable for 
supporting central bank active investment decisions, ideally with a one- to three-month time horizon. 
Table 3: Scorecard example 
  Section Indicator Scoring 
(eg + 2, –2) 
Weight 
     % 
Comments 
1  Quantitative indicator (2) +0.5 
 
33% 
 
The quantitative indicator points to 
the long side, but the signal is weak. 
2   Macro-economic consensus 
x US GDP expectations 
x US CPI expectations 
x FOMC Monetary policy decision 
expectations 
  
+ 1 
+ 0.5 
+ 1 
34% 
11.4% 
11.3% 
11.3% 
There are expectations of a 
slowdown in growth, subdued 
inflation and an accommodative 
monetary policy stance. 
3 Financial variables 
x Market consensus on rates on specific 
tenors 
x Market consensus on US Treasury curve 
slope 
   
 0 
 
-1 
33% 
16,5% 
 
16,5% 
 
The market consensus is in line with 
forward rates; extremely 
compressed term premium  
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Section 1 represents the quantitative indicator drawn from the estimates provided by the affine model. In this case, 
the normalised value is 0.5, signalling a moderate downside pressure on US yields; the weight of the quantitative 
indicator is set at 33%.  
Section 2 focuses on GDP and CPI consensus figures, as well as expectations on the Fed’s monetary policy; each 
element is weighted at just above 11%. 
Section 3 includes consensus financial variables, based on Reuters polls about the future level of the 10-year US 
Treasury yield over the relevant time horizon and on market consensus figures on the US yield curve slope (two- to 
10-year differential). Both are weighted at 16.5%. 
 
It is interesting to note that, in a context characterised by unconventional monetary policies like those prevailing 
over the last few years, the importance of monetary policy measures grows, as exceptional liquidity conditions may 
override other factors. Therefore, weights should be calibrated accordingly. In addition, in an extremely low rate 
environment, where monetary policy is often implemented through outright purchases of securities, the impact of such 
measures along the yield curve should also be considered while calibrating monetary policy weights for different 
curve buckets.  
       
For each factor, a positive score supports a rate decrease (long position), while a negative score supports a rate 
increase (short position). The score value reflects the magnitude of the expected impact of a specific factor: values of 
+2 (–2) mean that the current expectations are particular strong (weak), while a zero means that expectations are in 
line with past average values.  
 
Therefore, raw data must be standardised: for example, a GDP consensus figure at 2.5% requires the calculation of 
a Z score18 and then the standardisation of the Z score into a range (+2, –2 in the example). The value is calculated on 
a rolling window.   
 ࢆܩܦܲ݁ݔ݌ ൌ െቀீ஽௉௘௫௣ିࣆீ஽௉࣌ீ஽௉ ቁ                                                                                                                        (30) 
At first sight, inclusion of the multifactor analytical indicator as a key input of the scorecard, together with 
macroeconomic and financial variables, may seem like an instance of input duplication. In other words, the same kind 
of data being used to construct the quantitative indicator may appear to feed into Sections 2 and 3 of the scorecard. 
However, this is not true. Sections 2 and 3 are not concerned with actual data or sentiment indicators, but rather include 
market consensus figures on economic and financial developments. Bloomberg and Reuters provide updated figures 
on a continuous basis, adequately addressing the need for data reflecting changes in expectations related to new, 
incoming information. 
 
It is also important to recognise that the set of macroeconomic and financial variables is pre-defined but flexible. First, 
each scorecard user assesses the relative importance of each variable at that specific point in time;19 this assessment 
determines the actual selection of the set of variables to be used in the scorecard, within the broader universe of 
potentially eligible factors, as well as the calibration of relative weights of variables and sections. As a base case, all 
three sections are equally weighted in the example above.  
 
As a second step, a weighted average of the scores is calculated, indicating the side and magnitude of the position. In 
 
 
18 The Z-score is multiplied by -1 because the scorecard output is a position vs benchmark, that will be positive/long in case negative Z-scores 
related to macroeconomic and financial variables (eg very negative GDP consensus will produce a positive output in terms of duration exposure vs 
benchmark). 
19  For example, among growth-related variables, GDP data may prove more relevant than employment data, depending on the general 
macroeconomic context; among monetary policy-related variables, central bank balance sheet developments may – at times – be a more significant 
driver for the market than policy rates. 
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the example, the weighted average (WA) is 0.2835, pointing to a moderately long position that compares with a 
maximum possible weighted average of 2.  
 
Finally, a risk budget to be managed through the scorecard is defined, so that a +/–2 WA would encompass the usage 
of the entire budget on the long/short side, while WA between –2/+2 would bring about a proportional usage of the 
budget. Assuming a 40 basis point risk budget in terms of duration, the WA as of the example would result in +5.67 
duration basis points versus the benchmark. 
 
ࢃ࡭
ሺǤ ሻʹͲ ൈ  
 
 ૙ǡ૛ૡ૜૞૛ ൈ ͶͲ ൌ ͷǡ͸͹ 
 
It should be clearly noted that, in order to be implemented within the portfolio, the above indication requires a 
further step; namely an assessment of how to establish the long positioning on the relevant segments of the yield curve. 
Any such assessment can be made by the portfolio manager independently of the scorecard; alternatively, it may be 
deemed appropriate to produce two or more ad hoc scorecards for the curve segments in question (eg two and seven 
years), each incorporating the corresponding quantitative indicator and the macro and financial variables considered 
most significant for the selected maturities. In this case, the risk budget would be allocated along the curve consistently 
with the output of the scorecards. 
 
5. Fitting the tools into the governance framework 
Active fund management by central banks is usually framed within a robust and well designed governance 
structure, allocating responsibilities across appropriate hierarchical levels, providing clear rules for the delegation of 
authority, while also ensuring an adequate distinction between reserve management responsibilities and those related 
to institutional functions.21  
 
The governing board typically makes strategic decisions about the desired trade-off between risks and returns and 
the related asset allocation, establishing the key features of the investment framework. Optimisation processes aimed 
at determining the best strategic asset allocation (SAA), given policy objectives, return preferences and investment 
constraints, are widely used to guide the decision-making bodies. SAA time horizons vary considerably among central 
banks. In principle, decisions of this kind may be regarded as relatively structural; some central banks have no pre-
defined time horizon for SAA, instead carrying out only ad hoc reviews. In fact, shorter time horizons ranging between 
one and three years seem to be the most common approach.22 
 
The active portfolio management layer of the governance framework implements the actual reserve management 
strategy and takes additional risk within pre-defined budgets, with the aim of generating extra return. The relationship 
between the governing board and the portfolio management layer can be stylised as a principal, whereby the board, as 
the principal, delegates some risk-taking to staff, acting as an agent within predetermined limits; a further distinction 
can be made between agents charged with taking financial risks and those responsible for monitoring and control.23 
Committees are often introduced at different levels of the governance framework, offering the benefit of group 
decision-making and information processing. The governing board may delegate specific tasks or receive advice from 
 
 
20 In the example as of Table 3, the maximum possible score (in absolute terms) is 2. 
21 See: IMF (2013) ,Section C. 
22 See footnote 3. 
23 See BIS (2013). 
116   R. Violi et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  29 ( 2015 )  96 – 121 
a high level/strategic committee, while some decisions concerning the implementation of strategies may be delegated 
to an investment committee. 
 
In point of fact some central banks that actively manage their reserves adopt a governance that includes an 
intermediate, tactical level, whereby the investment committee is directly involved in actual risk-taking, with the 
overall active risk budget being allocated between the investment committee and the portfolio management level. The 
measurement and reporting of the results of each active level ensure accountability and a clear distinction of 
responsibilities.  
 
The survey conducted for the purpose of this study24 reveals that, out of 21 central banks actively managing their 
reserves, 13 adopt a three-layer framework, usually including a tactical/investment committee (Table 4). These 
committees differ in terms of composition, participating hierarchical levels and time horizons. In most cases, the 
committee involves senior management of the operations department, but it is not uncommon to have top management 
participate in tactical asset allocation (TAA) by way of an executive board approving decisions or a board member 
chairmanship overseeing the investment committee. In terms of time horizons, the survey shows a majority of central 
banks focusing on the one- to six-month range for TAA, though some extend it to one year. The survey also shows 
the degree to which approaches for elaborating tactical asset allocation may vary. All central banks assign a key role 
to a qualitative assessment of expected interest rate developments, based on factors such as economic fundamentals, 
technicals and market positioning; a minority of central banks use scorecards or other scoring systems to process such 
information. In some cases, the resulting interest rate scenario is translated into tactical positioning without any 
quantitative support; more frequently, the qualitative assessment feeds into quantitative analysis, with the aim of 
establishing a tactical benchmark portfolio through an optimisation process, or simply calibrating and validating the 
size of positions.   
 
 
 
24 See footnote 4. 
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Table 4: Survey on reserve management governance and tools (21 EU central banks, September 2014) 
 
Some central banks choose an investment framework that includes the intermediate active level, which often creates 
an additional benchmark with an objective function of outperforming strategic asset allocation. Furthermore, it is quite 
specific to central banks; this level is not otherwise found within the asset management industry.  
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Within this industry, in general, the principal/agent model is the cornerstone of investment governance, whereby 
the fund owner (the client) is the principal and the asset management firm is the agent. Asset management firms exhibit 
a broad range of organisational structures intended to convey to teams in charge of managing clients’ portfolios 
medium- to long-term investment themes and key risk positions, thus ensuring consistency across portfolios and a 
proper share of responsibilities between staff and firms’ senior management. These approaches do not usually involve 
the creation of additional benchmarks, expressing active positioning versus clients’ benchmark, but rather envisage 
an important top-down component within the investment process.  
 
One reason for the difference between the standard industry approach and that adopted by a sizeable portion of the 
central bank community may be found in the wide hierarchical gap, typical of central banks, between the principal 
(the board) and the agent (staff dedicated to portfolio management and risk control). Such a gap invites a direct 
involvement of senior management in the risk-taking process, with a clear attribution of responsibilities and 
measurable results, that tactical benchmarking are able to facilitate. In addition, a three-layer framework may improve 
central bank management’s awareness of risk exposures stemming from active reserve management operations 
(including why they arise and their potential consequences25). Last but not least, central banks’ investment public 
utility function is quite specific and distinct from traditional risk/return paradigms, as it is characterised by the crucial 
importance of safety/liquidity objectives and also by particular aversion to reputational risk. It may be argued that the 
direct involvement of senior management in active positioning may, through their closer association with these key 
objectives, help ensure that decisions remain consistent with a central bank’s public utility function. 
 
Due to the lack of relevant public statistics, it is impossible to formulate a broad-based assessment on whether the 
intermediate level really provides – in general and in the long term – value-added to active reserve management, 
increased total excess return and strategic asset allocation. Though the two-layer framework is simpler, should the 
intermediate level come at a cost (ie a negative contribution of the tactical positioning to total excess return), this may 
be acceptable to a central bank in so far as it helps allocate responsibilities consistently within its hierarchical structure. 
 
Despite the absence of extra-return statistics on the tactical layer, it is still worth considering whether this level of 
the active investment process may suffer from its hybrid nature. Due to its time horizon, neither typical long-term 
oriented strategic asset allocation tools, nor the approaches normally supporting day-to-day portfolio management 
strategies, would adequately fulfill the needs of the tactical level. Unlike strategic decisions, medium-term investment 
choices seem particularly exposed to episodes triggering violent but short-lived market movements; such episodes can 
generate noise at the time of tactical decision-making processes and also create the need for a position management 
that is not in line with the medium-term horizon. In addition, a broad range of tools is available for processing 
information supporting strategic asset allocation as well as short-term trading. However, there are fewer instruments 
at hand for intermediate time horizons. This brief outline seems, to some extent, reflected by the heterogeneity of 
approaches adopted by central banks in their tactical allocation frameworks.26 
 
Returning to the toolbox enhancements proposed above, there are several reasons the scorecard approach 
incorporating the model-based indicator on yields – while adaptable to any active management – may be well suited 
to the tactical level.  
 
 
 
25 In IMF (2013), it is highlighted that “Reserve managers, including their top management, should be aware of and be able to account for 
potential financial losses and other consequences of the risk exposures they are prepared to accept. Active management based on expectation of 
movements in interest rates or exchange rates, or a choice by the reserve management entity to accept a higher risk tolerance in its benchmark 
portfolios, requires that management is able to monitor and control any cumulative financial losses”. Such need for awareness is probably more 
pronounced in central banks, compared to asset management firms, as the former are “multi-product” industries where senior and top management 
are not dedicated to the investment function, but rather deeply involved in crucial, institutional functions.  
26 See Table 4. 
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On the one hand, the multifactor quantitative indicator provides a clear signal based on a strictly empirical analysis 
of several macroeconomic and sentiment variables. On the other, the scorecard seems consistent with the collegial 
nature of investment committees, as the choice among a set of eligible input data and flexible weights allows for 
committee members to reach a consensus upon the selected variables and their relative importance. Furthermore, there 
is a fair degree of consistency between the monthly/quarterly time horizon of tactical decision-making and the typical 
frequency of scorecard inputs. All such factors underline the value-added of a tool that minimises subjectivity, 
supports synthesis and provides precise operational guidance 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper seeks to enlarge the toolbox available for active reserve managers focusing on a widespread need – within 
the central bank community – for a decision-making process that takes proper account of quantitative as well as 
qualitative factors. 
 
On the quantitative side, the starting point is a linear affine model incorporating sentiment and macro-economic 
variables, which allows for the exploitation of the predictable component (if any) embodied in term premia. Among 
the principal findings, it is worth highlighting that while the first three principal components explain about 99% of the 
variance of the yield change, the other two components may also add value. A further increase in its predictive power 
seems to be attainable by including a sentiment indicator among the explanatory variables. A simple and intuitive 
indicator (MQI) of long and short duration positioning is drawn from the expected excess return produced by the 
model. In principle, the model alone may be considered a useful tool for portfolio managers and decision-makers 
involved in active investment. However, some of the features typically characterising a central bank’s investment 
process suggest a need for further development. 
 
Reliance on purely quantitative indicators would enhance the automated nature of the decision-making process, 
but in ways that may not be fully consistent with a central bank’s obligation to be highly accountable in its management 
of public funds, especially in conditions of high market uncertainty. On the other hand, the subjectivity intrinsic to 
purely qualitative assessments, and the bias that may arise from personal opinions or behavioural elements, argue for 
structured processes, if possible, blending quantitative and qualitative indicators and also fostering a balanced 
consensus within the context of collegial decision-making. 
 
Scorecards and scoring systems for evaluating macroeconomic and financial information are nothing new, but the 
enhanced version developed in this paper contains some very specific elements: besides properly weighted 
macroeconomic and financial consensus variables, the scorecard also incorporates the MQI, whose weight can be 
calibrated also according to the desired balance between quantitative and qualitative factors. The final output is a more 
robust and comprehensive positioning indicator, compared to a “standalone” quantitative approach, particularly 
suitable for medium-term horizons. 
 
Finally, with a view to accommodating this tool within central bank investment governance, some remarks are 
formulated with respect to a particular layer of the investment process specific to certain central banks – the so-called 
tactical level. It is contended that the hybrid nature of this level, in terms of both time horizon and objective function, 
may involve some weaknesses and require specific tools in support of decision-making. The enhanced scorecard seems 
an appropriate response to the need for combining a wide range of highly diversified quantitative and qualitative inputs 
on medium-term horizons, promoting synthesis and discussion among committee members. 
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